Threat Advisory - NGINX HTTP/2 RCE: CVE-2026-123007
Snowbit advisory on CVE-2026-123007, an NGINX HTTP/2 flow-control RCE: how it works, affected versions, fixed releases, the HTTP/2 workaround and remediation.
Threat Detection & Response Team5 min read

Executive Summary
On November 18, 2026, F5 released NGINX 1.31.9 (mainline) and 1.30.7 (stable) to fix CVE-2026-123007, a memory corruption flaw in how NGINX handles HTTP/2 flow control. An attacker who can reach an NGINX server over HTTP/2 can use it to run code on that server without logging in. Every NGINX Open Source release from 1.9.5 (2015) through 1.31.8 is affected. Wiz rates it Critical at 9.2 (CVSS 4.0); nginx.org lists its severity as major. The same release fixes a second HTTP/2 remote code execution bug, CVE-2026-123633 (use-after-free, 1.19.7 to 1.31.8), along with several other issues.
Wiz rates the bug exploitable in default configurations, but working exploitation is constrained: Rapid7's CVSS vector is AC:H/AT:P, and the public exploit needs TLS, about 128 GB of HTTP/2 traffic (about 60 GB to crash a worker) and enough bandwidth that below roughly 300 Mbit/s the default one-hour connection limit cuts it off, depends on glibc's AVX-512 memcpy on x86-64, and runs code only as the NGINX worker user, not root. Wiz demonstrated code execution, with an ASLR bypass, against official NGINX 1.31.7 and 1.31.8 builds serving ordinary static files over HTTPS on 64-bit systems, with no backend application or third-party module involved. Wiz Research, Ikotas Labs, Metnir, Rapid7 and Xint found the flaw independently.
Wiz is withholding its own exploits, but a public proof of concept is already on GitHub. It achieves unauthenticated code execution against a freshly started NGINX 1.31.8 Docker container, and its author expects it to fail against busy production servers. None of the sources reports exploitation in the wild. Upgrade now, and turn HTTP/2 off on any server you cannot patch today.
How It Works
- Uncapped refund: NGINX tracks how much data it may still send on an HTTP/2 connection in a counter,
send_window. When a stream is cancelled with data still queued,ngx_http_v2_filter_cleanup()adds the unused allowance back without checking the HTTP/2 maximum. If the client has already raised the window, the counter ends up above that maximum. - Bounds check underflow:
ngx_http_v2_state_window_update()validates eachWINDOW_UPDATEby subtractingsend_windowfrom the maximum. Oncesend_windowis above the maximum, the unsigned subtraction wraps to a huge number and the check passes. The attacker then sends a large number ofWINDOW_UPDATEframes to drive the counter to an arbitrary value. - Negative length:
ngx_http_v2_send_chain()converts the counter to the signedoff_ttype. A large enough value turns negative and produces a response buffer whose end pointer sits before its start. - Out-of-bounds copy: In the TLS send path,
ngx_ssl_send_chain()turns the bad length into an out-of-bounds memory copy. The attacker uses it to read memory, which defeats ASLR, then corrupts the heap and executes code in the NGINX worker.
// ngx_http_v2_filter_cleanup(): refund with no upper bound
h2c->send_window += window;
// ngx_http_v2_state_window_update(): wraps once send_window > max
if (window > NGX_HTTP_V2_MAX_WINDOW - h2c->send_window)
Any exploit needs direct HTTP/2 access to NGINX. Wiz notes that a CDN or WAF that terminates HTTP/2 itself may break parts of the exploit, depending on the implementation. The public PoC needs a clean heap and a large data transfer; its author expects it to fail with concurrent clients, a long-running worker, limited bandwidth or a proxy that alters HTTP/2 frames.
Timeline
| Date & Time (UTC) | Event |
|---|---|
| 2015 | NGINX 1.9.5 released; first version containing the flaw |
| 2026-10-21 | Wiz reports the companion HTTP/2 use-after-free (later CVE-2026-123633) to F5 |
| 2026-11-16 | Wiz reports the send_window flaw to F5 |
| 2026-11-17 | F5 confirms the report matches CVE-2026-123007, already scheduled for the November 18 release |
| 2026-11-18 | F5 ships NGINX 1.31.9 and 1.30.7; coordinated disclosure; Wiz publishes its analysis |
| As of 2026-11-19 | Public PoC on GitHub (sfewer-r7/CVE-2026-123007), linked to a Rapid7 analysis; no in-the-wild exploitation reported |
Key Affected Packages
Only servers with HTTP/2 enabled are exposed. nginx.org lists fixes in 1.31.9 and 1.30.7 only; older branches get no backport. The community kubernetes/ingress-nginx ships NGINX 1.27.1 with HTTP/2 on by default; the project is archived and will not be patched, and the Rancher and Chainguard forks are not patched either. NGINX Plus versions differ across sources; confirm them against F5 article K000163926.
| Key Affected Package | Vulnerable Versions | Safe Version |
|---|---|---|
| NGINX Open Source (mainline) | 1.31.0 to 1.31.8 | 1.31.9 |
| NGINX Open Source (stable) | 1.30.0 to 1.30.6 | 1.30.7 |
| NGINX Open Source (older branches) | 1.9.5 to 1.29.x | No fix on branch; move to 1.30.7 or 1.31.9 |
| NGINX Plus | R33/R34–R36 (no fix: move to 37.x), 37.0.0–37.0.7.1, 37.1.0–37.2.0.1 | 37.0.8.1 / 37.3.0.1 |
| ingress-nginx (community Kubernetes) | 1.27.1 bundled; HTTP/2 on by default | No fix (project archived); set use-http2: "false" or migrate |
| NGINX Ingress Controller (F5) | Before 5.8.0 | 5.8.0 |
| NGINX Gateway Fabric | Before 2.9.0; HTTP/2 on by default | 2.9.0 |
Remediation
One upgrade covers both HTTP/2 bugs. 1.31.9 and 1.30.7 also fix CVE-2026-123633 and the other issues in the November 18 release.
If you suspect your environment or packages have been affected, follow these steps:
- Find exposed servers: Run
nginx -von every host and container image, thennginx -T 2>/dev/null | grep -nE 'http2|listen'to see where HTTP/2 is enabled. Include NGINX inside container images and Kubernetes ingress controllers. - Patch: Move to 1.31.9 or 1.30.7 (NGINX Plus 37.0.8.1 or 37.3.0.1), rebuild images on the patched base, then reload. Check with
ps -o pid,lstart,args -C nginxthat no worker started before the upgrade is still running. - Interim workaround: If you cannot patch today, disable HTTP/2. On 1.25.1 or later set
http2 off;in the affected server blocks, and remove thehttp2parameter from everylistendirective. Runnginx -t && nginx -s reload, confirm the old workers have exited, and turn HTTP/2 back on after upgrading. - Prioritize: Patch internet-facing NGINX that terminates HTTP/2 itself first. A CDN or WAF in front may disrupt parts of the exploit, but Wiz says that depends on the implementation, so treat it as an extra layer and still patch.
- Check for compromise: Review hosts for unexpected NGINX worker crashes, commands launched by NGINX, and long-lived HTTP/2 connections moving large volumes of data. Wiz calls the first two general warning signs, not confirmed indicators.
Indicators of Compromise
No IPs, domains, hashes or attacker infrastructure have been published for CVE-2026-123007.
| Type | Indicators |
|---|---|
| CVE | CVE-2026-123007 · CVSS 4.0 9.2 (Wiz) · severity major (nginx.org) · F5 K000163926 |
| Related CVE | CVE-2026-123633 · HTTP/2 use-after-free · fixed in the same releases |
| Protocol Behavior | Large numbers of HTTP/2 WINDOW_UPDATE frames; long-lived HTTP/2 connections sending large volumes of data |
| Host Behavior | Unexpected NGINX worker crashes; commands launched by NGINX worker processes |
| Public PoC | hxxps://github[.]com/sfewer-r7/CVE-2026-123007 (simple-trigger-poc.py, exploit/exploit.py) |
Snowbit Response
- Threat monitoring: We are tracking the public PoC and vendor updates. If exploitation is reported in the wild or IOCs are released, we will hunt for them across SRC customer environments.
We strongly recommend all customers find every NGINX instance with HTTP/2 enabled, upgrade to 1.31.9 or 1.30.7 (NGINX Plus 37.0.8.1 or 37.3.0.1), and disable HTTP/2 on any server that cannot be patched today.


